Previous neuroimaging studies of scenarios such as the prisoner's dilemma and ultimatum game show how brain systems which evolved to process rewarding and aversive stimuli are activated differentially during adherence to and breaches of norms. One theory of how shared social norms evolve is that they arise from mutually rewarding conventions which, via repeated execution, acquire a normative value which sustains social cohesion even when individual self interest is not served. Here we report an fMRI study of a two player coordination game in which players must coordinate on an arbitrary convention (a left or right button press) to obtain monetary rewards. Once this convention has been established, one of the participants is incentivised to deviate from the equilibrium with the offer of extra reward. During the period prior to decisions to violate the convention, activity was observed in regions associated with reward processing, such as the mid-brain, caudate and orbitofrontal cortex. Activations in advance of decisions to continue coordinating included the amygdala and anterior insula / inferior frontal gyrus. The data are discussed in the light of theories which propose the existence of multiple interacting value-based decision making systems in the human brain.
Abstract
Previous neuroimaging studies of scenarios such as the prisoner's dilemma and ultimatum game show how brain systems which evolved to process rewarding and aversive stimuli are activated differentially during adherence to and breaches of norms. One theory of how shared social norms evolve is that they arise from mutually rewarding conventions which, via repeated execution, acquire a normative value which sustains social cohesion even when individual self interest is not served. Here we report an fMRI study of a two player coordination game in which players must coordinate on an arbitrary convention (a left or right button press) to obtain monetary rewards. Once this convention has been established, one of the participants is incentivised to deviate from the equilibrium with the offer of extra reward. During the period prior to decisions to violate the convention, activity was observed in regions associated with reward processing, such as the mid-brain, caudate and orbitofrontal cortex. Activations in advance of decisions to continue coordinating included the amygdala and anterior insula / inferior frontal gyrus. The data are discussed in the light of theories which propose the existence of multiple interacting value-based decision making systems in the human brain.
INTRODUCTION
While economic and evolutionary analyses of social norms are well developed (UllmannMargalit, 1977; Elster, 1989; Bicchieri, 2006; Gintis, 2009 ) research into the neural basis of norm-driven behaviour is still in its infancy (Montague and Lohrenz 2007) . To date these studies take the existence of norms as given and observe participants while they cope with dilemmas to either adhere to existing norms such as altruism or act in their own material selfinterest (Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; deQuervain et al., 2004; Spitzer et al., 2007; Haruno and Frith, 2010) . These designs are useful, but also lack realism. The subjects for example typically do not have a history of mutual cooperation before they face the experimental dilemma to violate (or conform to) a social norm. This contrasts with the wellestablished fact in evolutionary biology and anthropology that social norms tend to arise (and to be enforced) primarily in the context of repeated small-group interactions (Henrich and Henrich, 2007) . Here we report an fMRI study of a repeated coordination game designed to model how social norms might evolve by repeated execution of an arbitrary but mutually rewarding behavioural convention. We then created dilemma situations during which one of the participants was given an incentive to deviate from the established convention.
The idea that society is a gigantic coordination game and that social norms emerge via the repeated play of such games goes back at least to the philosopher David Hume (Hume 1748).
The idea has been revived and articulated in the last century by game theorists and social scientists interested in the emergence of cooperation (Schelling, 1960; Lewis 1969 , Sugden 1986 Skyrms, 1996 Skyrms, , 2004 Binmore, 1998 Binmore, , 2005 . Empirical studies have shown that humans perform better than would be expected by chance at coordination games in the laboratory.
One explanation for this is that people engage in 2 nd order theorising about how others perceive the salience of competing choices in such tasks (Mehta et al., 1994) . Behavioural studies also suggest that mutually rewarding conventions develop social normative value such that participants continue with a coordinating strategy even when their material interest is not directly served by it (Guala and Mittone, 2010) . This tendency to comply with established norms may have evolved from a natural aversion to violating others' expectations and a tendency to seek others' approval (Sugden 1986 (Sugden , 1998 . This is consistent with previous studies that have observed activity in limbic areas of the brain related to approach / avoidance behaviour and emotion during norm violation (Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003) .
The present study used fMRI to study brain activity in a two player coordination game. Once a coordinating convention / equilibrium had been established in the two players, one of them was given an incentive to deviate from the convention with the offer of additional monetary reward. We reasoned that similar patterns of activity should be observed in this situation as has been reported in previous fMRI studies of social/moral dilemmas. Based on these studies we predicted activation within regions associated with negative affect such as the anterior insula cortex and amygdala during norm violation (Hampton et al., 2007; Sanfey et al., 2003; Phillips et al., 1997; Adolphs et al., 2004) . We also expected activations in structures implicated in the processing of rewards such as the mid-brain, striatum and orbitofrontal cortex during decisions that had social as well as monetary value to participants (Schultz, 2000; Rilling et al., 2002; Klucharev et al., 2009; O'Doherty et al., 2001; O'Doherty et al., 2002) .
Activity in other brain areas was expected when participants engaged in inhibition of reward driven responding or 2 nd order reasoning about another's intentions. Previous studies have linked these processes to areas of the prefrontal cortex (Greene et al., 2004; Hare et al., 2009; Spitzer et al., 2007) . In particular the rostral medial prefrontal cortex is an area which has been strongly implicated in tasks that demand mentalising about others (Hampton et al., 2008; Krueger et al., 2009) and formulating predictions about future actions.
METHODS

Behavioural task
The behavioural task comprised a coordination game in which both participants could gain monetary rewards by selecting either a left or right button press response. On each round participants were presented with a decision screen (Figure 1b ) which depicted the payoff matrix for that round. After a decision had been made and following a delay period in which the screen was blank (see fMRI Methods and Analysis section below) an outcome screen was displayed ( Figure 1c ) describing what had happened on the last round including the choice of the other player, the gains made in that round and the cumulative gains made in the game thus far. Participants were told that the experiment would last for "approximately 20 rounds" although in fact the game always lasted 21 rounds (this was done so that players could not predict exactly when the game would end whilst at the same time being aware of its approximate duration). On "Normal" rounds both players were rewarded for selecting the same button press. As well as these Normal coordinating rounds, participants were instructed beforehand that a number of "Special" rounds could also occur at unspecified points in the game. They were told that on these Special rounds the payoffs may change and some players may not be told about the changes. The actual monetary payoff structure used in the game for Normal and Special rounds is shown in Figure 1a . On these rounds the potential deviant participant, hereafter referred to as "Player 1", was given a monetary incentive to deviate from the established coordinating convention, whilst "Player 2" was still only rewarded for continued coordination. For both rounds types Player 1 always saw both their own and others payoffs whilst Player 2 only had information concerning their own payoffs in the task. Unknown to the participants, Special rounds were always programmed to occur on rounds 9, 13, 17 and 21.
The instruction sheet included an example payoff matrix of the type that they would later see on the screen during the experiment on Normal rounds.
Following the final round, Player 2 was presented with a final decision screen which gave them the option to punish Player 1 for deviating on Special rounds. Both participants were unaware that this punishment decision would occur at the end of the experiment as the instructions given prior to the experiment did not inform them that this would happen. The amount of monetary punishment for Player 1 was equivalent to the payout received by player 1 on Special rounds for which they opted to deviate (i.e. £2 x number of deviations). However, the instruction screen also informed Player 2 that if they chose to deduct this amount from Player 2 their total winnings would be deducted by a smaller sum equivalent to a Normal coordinating round payout (50p) x the number of Special rounds on which Player 1 choose to deviate. Following Player 2's decision Player 1 was shown an outcome screen which indicated whether or not Player 2 had opted to punish them by deducting money.
At the end of the testing session participants were given the money that they had won in the game, typically between £5 and £18 per participant depending on the outcome of the game and whether they had been assigned as Player 1 or Player 2.
The experimental task was implemented using custom software developed within the Z-tree programming environment for experimental economics (Fischbacher, 2007) . The non-scanned participant performed the task on a computer in the scanner control room linked to the computer used by the scanned participant via a local Ethernet connection. Visual stimuli were presented to the scanned subjects on a projection screen which they viewed via a mirror mounted on the head coil as they lay prone in the scanner. Choice decisions for the scanned participants were recorded using a press button box connected to a computer in the control room via a fibre optic link. The non-scanned participants indicated their choices using a mouse click to an on-screen button. 
Participants
FMRI Methods and analysis procedure
The experiment was carried out using a 1.5T Philips Gyroscan Intera Scanner in the Peninsula MR Research Centre, St Lukes campus, University of Exeter. A T2*-weighted echoplanar sequence was used (TR = 3000ms, TE = 50ms, flip angle 90°, 32 transverse slices, 3.6 x 3.6 x 4mm, ascending acquisition). 125 volumes were acquired in each of the 4 runs per subject. An additional 5 "dummy" scans were performed at the start of each block prior to the start of the stimulus sequence. Data were analysed using SPM5 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The images were realigned, unwarped to remove variance caused by movement-by-field inhomogeneity interactions, normalised to a standard EPI template, and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6mm full-width at half maximum.
On each round the BOLD response was assessed for two "mini-epochs": (1) the Decision period during which the participant was viewing the payoff matrix for that round and deciding which button to press; and (2) the "Outcome period" during which he / she was viewing the choices made by self other on that round and the monetary payments made to each player.
The duration of the Decision period epoch was determined by the participants' reaction time to press one of the two buttons from stimulus onset up to a maximum of 20 seconds. As soon as the participants had made their decision the display screen was blanked out until the display of the Outcome period screen, which was always presented 30 seconds after the onset of the decision period screen. The duration of the Outcome period was constant at 10 seconds (corresponding to the time the outcome display was presented on the screen). A further 12 seconds then elapsed prior to the onset of the next trial's Decision screen.
Each participant's fMRI data was analysed using a statistical model comprising a series of statistical regressors derived by convolving task event onsets and durations with a canonical hemodynamic response function. The GLM approach was used to assess correlations between the measured BOLD response and each regressor of interest. For the first level (individual subject) analysis translational and rotational head movement parameters were included as nuisance covariates. One sample t-tests on the statistical regressors of interest were generated for each participant and entered in the 2 nd level ("random effects") analysis to look for statistically significant patterns of activation across participants as a group. Decision period activity for Player 1 participants was analysed using a 2 x 2 factorial model with round type (Normal / Special) and decision (coordinate / deviate) as factors. A 2 x 2 factorial model was applied to outcome period activations for the Player 2 participants for coordinate and non-coordinate Special and Normal round outcomes. Coordinate and non-coordinate Normal round outcomes
were also compared using a two sample t-test which combined data from both Player 1 and Player 2 participants. Covariates were also included in the 2 nd level models to control for intersubject variance arising from two factors: the number of coordinating rounds achieved prior to the first Special round and whether or not the participant did or did not meet the other player in the waiting room before hand (see Participants above and Behavioural results below).
Six participants were excluded from the 2 nd level fMRI factorial analysis described below either to bad fMRI data (2 participants) or a failure to make at least one example of the 
RESULTS
Behavioural results.
Choice behaviour t=3.35, p=0.002). The factor of whether or not participants met the other player was included as a between-subjects covariate in the 2 nd level random effects analysis of the fMRI data to control for differences in activity due solely to this factor (see fMRI Methods and Analysis Procedure).
As well as the expected periods of non-coordination on early Normal rounds we also observed a minority of non-coordinating outcomes on later Normal rounds which breached the established coordinating convention (8% of all Normal rounds). In 11 out of the 32 participant pairs (4% of Special rounds overall) a deviation by Player 1 still resulted in a "coordinating" outcome due to a spontaneous breach in the coordinating convention by Player 2. In these cases Player 1's decision was still classed as a deviate decision for the sake of the fMRI analysis. The occurrence of non-coordinating Normal outcomes made by both players after a coordinating convention had been established may constitute an example of the so-called "trembling hand" effect in economic games (Selten, 1988) whereby participants occasionally deviate from an established optimum equilibrium without apparent explanation.
Previous behavioural studies have shown the number of prior coordinating rounds to have an effect on the likelihood of participants deviating on Special rounds in a 3 player version of the coordination game (Guala and Mittone, 2010) . However, in the current study the number of prior coordinating rounds did not significantly affect the likelihood of participants deviating on Special rounds (although see below). However, the number of pre-Special coordinating rounds was also included as a between subjects covariate in the main 2 nd level random effects analysis of fMRI data to control for this factor (see fMRI Methods and Analysis Procedure).
Finally only 2 of the Player 2 participants chose to deduct money from Player 1 at the end of the session. Due to the small number of such deduction decisions and the fact that participants were only faced with one such decision at the end of the session, the punishment phase was not modeled in the fMRI statistical analysis.
Decision Times
We also analysed the time taken for participants to make decisions on the different round types and for the different decision types. Decision times were not found to differ significantly for Special rounds on which Player 1 choose to deviate relative to coordinate (F(1,12)=0.27).
However, decision times were significantly increased for the first relative to subsequent 
fMRI results
Decision period activity
Special / Normal rounds (Player 1):
A two sample t-test examining voxels which showed significantly more activity for Special round decisions relative to Normal round decisions revealed large activation clusters (>20 voxels) in the mid-brain (2,-24,-23), anterior cingulate gyrus BA32 (-14,39,-4) and BA24 (-4,29,-1); The head of caudate nucleus (-12,19,-6 );
parahippocampal gyrus BA37 (30, -45,-10), Inferior frontal gyrus / anterior insula (BA47) (24,7,-17) ; Medial prefrontal cortex BA10 (32,52,-9) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex / middle frontal gyrus (BA9) (34, 38, 29) .
Coordination / deviate decisions (Special rounds Player 1):
We also compared activity on Special rounds in the period leading up to either coordinate or deviate decisions. Table 1a and Figure 3a illustrates the results for Special rounds where Player 1 opted to continue coordinating, illustrating activation in the anterior insula, amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in advance of these decisions. The opposite contrast, examining regions which showed increased activity for deviate relative to coordinate decisions included activity in the bilateral head of caudate nucleus and orbitofrontal cortex as well as a strong locus of activity in the mid-brain (Table 1b Figure 3a ).
Outcome period activity
Special rounds (Player 2): Outcome period activity in Player 2 for rounds on which Player 1 opted to coordinate or deviate were examined using a two sample t-test. Comparison of coordinate versus deviate outcomes revealed a large cluster of activation in the rostro-medial prefrontal cortex corresponding to bilateral BA10 (-3,59,-8; 25,51,17) and BA9 (-23,28,24; 13,49,19) . The reverse contrast comparing deviate and coordinate round outcomes highlighted a different locus within the rostro-medial prefrontal cortex (-15,36,-3) along with the anterior cingulate gyrus BA32 (21,44,5). Despite further examination of these contrasts at a reduced statistical threshold (p<0.01 uncorrected), Special round outcome activity following Player 1 deviations was not observed in regions previously linked to negative affective processing as predicted by our apriori hypotheses (e.g. amygdala / anterior insula, see introduction).
Normal round outcomes (Players 1 and 2):
Outcome period activity was also compared on
Normal rounds in the cases where the other player either spontaneously deviated from an established norm or continued coordinating with the stable convention (see Behavioural results). Regions with increased activity for coordinate relative to deviate outcomes included the amygdala, medio-dorsal thalamus and parahippocampal gyrus as well as the mid-brain (Table 2a , Figure 3b ). For the deviate relative to coordinate Normal round outcome comparison significant activity was observed in the bilateral anterior insula, along with the midbrain (substantia nigra) and rostral medial prefrontal cortex (Table 2b ; Figure 3b ).
DISCUSSION
This is the first study to examine brain areas involved in interactive decision making in a social dilemma task embedded in the context of a longer series of coordination tasks.
Previous studies that ignored the "historical" context of social behaviour had focused on decisions concerning whether to share a sum of money fairly (Sanfey et al., 2003; Volz et al., 2009 ), whether to cooperate or defect (Rilling et al., 2002) or shirk / work in a job (Hampton et al., 2008) . Based on this body of work, successful cooperation was expected to be accompanied by activity in limbic, emotional and reward centres in the brain, reflecting the positive affective value of pro-social decisions over and above their monetary reward. We also predicted that breaches in the coordinating equilibrium would be associated with activity in regions linked to negative affect such as the anterior insula and amygdala. These expectations were only partially borne out by the present results, suggesting that decision making in repeated coordination/deviation tasks may rely on different mechanisms.
As expected, the decision to take advantage of the additional payment on Special rounds was linked to mid-brain, head of caudate and orbitofrontal activation, consistent with a response to an unanticipated reward (Schultz, 2000) (Table 1b) . Prior to coordinating decisions on Special rounds, some activation was present in structures implicated in reward processing (e.g. caudate nucleus), but significant activity was also observed in the amygdala and anterior insula, two areas more commonly associated with negative affective states (Table   1a ; Figure 3a) . One possibility is that activity in these regions reflects either an aversive response to deviating from a norm or the fear of losing an established equilibrium in the game.
This may interact with the rewarding aspects of social cooperative behaviour to influence participants' decision making on Special rounds (Rilling et al. 2002) .
It should be noted however that amygdala activity was also present for the socially and financially rewarding coordinating Normal round outcomes (Table2a; Figure 3b ). One possibility is that the amygdala's role in social processing is broader than commonly assumed.
As well as responding to negative stimuli it may also respond to other events which do not have a clear affective valence but are salient for social decisions (Adolphs et al., 2004) . Rather than a privileged role in processing fearful stimuli a more accurate view of amygdala function is that it plays a general role in modulating attention to and interpreting salient environmental events and stimuli (Small et al., 2003; Pessoa 2010) , tracking positive as well as negative reward expectancies (Belova et al., 2007) . This issue could be further investigated using a psycho-pharmacological approach. It has been suggested that the neuro-peptide oxytocin enhances pro social trust ) by down regulating activity in the amygdala (Baumgartner et al. 2008) . However, if amygdala activity on Special rounds truly reflects fear of the consequences of breaking a social norm, then oxytocin administration should attenuate this response leading to an increased rate of deviation in the current game.
A supplementary goal of the present experiment was to investigate the effect of previous coordination experience. Previous work using a 3 player version of a simple coordination game has provided evidence that the number of preceding coordinating rounds can affect the likelihood of participants deviating on Special rounds (Guala and Mittone, 2010) . This is consistent with the idea that arbitrary coordinating conventions "intrinsic" to the task can develop into social norms via repeated execution (see introduction). We did not find a significant effect of prior coordination on the likelihood of Players coordinating or deviating in the current study. However, analysis of the time taken for participants to make decisions showed that an extended period of coordination prior to first Special round affected decision time, such that decision times were longer for participant pairs who had coordinated on all 8 of the preceding Normal rounds relative to those that did not.
The number of coordinating rounds prior to the 1 st Special round was modelled as a "nuisance" covariate in the main factorial analysis of fMRI activity (see fMRI methods above).
However, given the behavioural effects described above and reasoning from social and evolutionary philosophy (see introduction), it might be expected that activation of brain areas associated with pro-social motives and cognitive functions should be stronger when social "groupness" and social norms have been reinforced by repetition. We also therefore carried out a supplementary analysis in which the effect of this factor on activity during the decision period on Special rounds was assessed. Activity in the bilateral amygdala increased significantly with the number of preceding coordinations, consistent with this region activating in response to anticipated breaches in social norms (Figure 4a ). In contrast, activity in the rostral medial prefrontal cortex was increased for participant pairs who achieved fewer coordinations prior to the first Special round, consistent with enhanced demands on mentalising processes in these participants (Figure 4b ). This result suggests that repeated execution of an arbitrary convention may modify the brain response to Special round decisions later in the game in a manner consistent with our supplementary hypotheses.
Anterior insula activity had been predicted for outcome periods when Player 2 saw that Player 1 had deviated on Special rounds, consistent with activation of a "social disgust"
response (Sanfey et al. 2003) . However this effect was not found. Instead, both coordinate and deviate outcomes mainly activated rostral medial prefrontal cortical areas (Table 2a) . A key difference in the current relative to previous studies is that the outcome screen revealed Player 1's altered payoff structure to Player 2. The reasons for Player 1's deviations (i.e. the additional monetary incentive) were therefore apparent to Player 2 following such decisions. It is possible that because of this, the strong affective response in participants was disrupted by the inception of higher cognitive processes devoted to rationalizing the surprising result (Hariri et al., 2000; Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004) . The strong locus of activity within rostral medial prefrontal regions during these outome periods is consistent with this explanation as activity in these regions has previously been implicated in mentalising processes. Further, the great majority of Player 2 participants opted not to exact a financial punishment on Player 1 at the end of the task, suggesting that they did not deem deviations on Special rounds as a breach of deep seated social norms.
Interestingly, when deviations did not have a clear rationale to the observer (i.e the payoff matrix shown during the outcome period revealed that there was no monetary incentive for the deviation), activity was observed in the bilateral anterior insula (Figure 2b ). Spontaneous deviations occurred on Normal rounds in most participant pairs even when a coordinating equilibrium had been established (see Behavioural Data). The reasons for players making these decisions are not clear, although the phenomenon of players spontaneously deviating from game equilibria has been explored elsewhere (Selten, 1988) . What is certain is that the outcomes on these rounds were not expected by the other player who had opted to continue with the mutually rewarding strategy established on the preceding rounds. These inexplicable "norm" breaches were also associated with activity in the mid-brain (substantia nigra) and rostral medial prefrontal cortex. Together these structures may be important in generating a social "prediction error" which mediates associative learning in social contexts (Table2b) (Hampton et al. 2008 ).
Although the above discussion has emphasised emotional factors as contributing to socially normative behaviour it is also likely that purely cognitive mechanisms contribute to adherence to social norms. For example, the observation of an action in another individual may itself provide a strong cue to initiating the same behaviour in the observer without the need to evoke the concept of a social norm (Gallese et al., 2004; Ochner et al., 2008; Bastiaansen et al. 2009 ). The anterior insula activity reported for Player 1 decisions to coordinate on Special rounds was located in the most superior and anterior part of this structure (BA47) which is contiguous with the inferior frontal gyrus, a region hypothesised to contain "mirror neurons" in humans (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) . Further studies could test the idea that norm adherence is a sophisticated form of response "mirroring" using a payoff structure which incentivised participants to adopt a "non-mirroring" convention (i.e. both players rewarded for a different response). This would eliminate the influence of imitative behavioural tendencies on decision making in the task. It would also eliminate the possible influence of the existing social norm of conformity on Special rounds. The role of this task-extrinsic norm is potentially problematic for the idea that the coordination game is a better model of the evolution of social norms than for example the prisoner's dilemma game. However, by modifying the payoff structure such that Player 1 would be incentivised to deviate by making the same response as the other participant the role of a social conformity bias could be directly assessed. Another process which has previously been linked to norm adherence is response inhibition.
Consistent with this mechanism being involved in norm adherence, both the dorsal and ventrolateral prefrontal regions were more active in advance of Special rounds where Player 1 chose not to take an increased payout and continued coordinating (Table 1a ) (Aron, 2004; Sanfey et al.,2003; Knoch et al., 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007) .
Recently a general framework has been proposed for understanding the neuroscience of value-based decision making (Rangel, Camerer, Montague, 2008) . According to this account at least three different levels of hierarchical control can influence choice behaviour. A "Pavlovian" system controls automatic behaviour triggered by a narrow range of stimuli and largely independent from the actual needs of the organism (for example, grabbing food even if not hungry). An "Habitual" system in contrast learns associations between positive/negative outcomes and a larger repertoire of behaviour (for example receiving a reward for coordinating with your partner). These learned behavioural drives can come into conflict with "Goaldirected" control which seeks to realise rewards by computing the value of choices in a new situation, for example a change in the outcome contingencies in a strategic game. These three systems are suggested to work together to determine the values of competing behavioural choice options confronted by humans, but an open question is how social and moral norms influence valuation of choice options within such a framework.
One idea would be that cooperative norms arise from repeated stimulus-response associations learned by the habit based system, which over time acquire additional value within the goal-directed system over and above their immediate material and monetary value.
The observed mid-brain activity during decision and outcome periods on Special rounds for which Player 1 deviated is consistent with the hypothesis that outcome-value computations are evoked during conformity to social norms. The modulating effect of the number of prior coordinations on Normal rounds in activity during Special round decisions (see above and
Figure 4) could also be interpreted as reflecting the strength of a learned coordinating "habit".
Nevertheless, although such speculation is of theoretical interest we acknowledge there is no direct evidence in our data that can cleanly separate the role of habitual and goal-directed choice systems or establish that coordinating conventions constitute a learned habit.
Indeed, we suggest that extreme caution should always be exercised in making "reverse inferences" linking fMRI activations to cognitive and emotional processes. The role of the OFC and striatum in value based decision making is still controversial as are the roles of the amygdala and rostral medial prefrontal cortex in social and emotional processing. In the case of the OFC for example, some studies have implied that the lateral / medial division in the structure relates to outcome valence (ODoherty et al. 2001; Small et al. 2003) , with lateral areas coding negative outcomes and medial areas responding to positive outcomes.
However, other work has shown that the medial OFC maintains steady stimulus-outcome associations, whereas the lateral OFC represents changing (unsteady) outcomes irrespective of valence, such that it is particularly unexpected outcomes cause lateral OFC activity (Windmann et al., 2006) .
One potential criticism of the current design is that on Special rounds participants received additional informational content in the decision period compared to the more frequent Normal rounds. Activations observed for the contrast of Special versus Normal rounds may at least partially reflect the increased information processing demands of Special rounds relative to Normal rounds rather than the social / affective decision making demands of the task.
However, such an account would not be able to explain the observed differences in activations dependent upon Player 1's decision to coordinate or deviate on these rounds (Table 1 ; Figure   3a ) or the observed correlation between activity and the preceding number of successful coordinations (Figure 4) . Similarly for outcome related activity the differences in activity observed decisions to either deviate or coordinate on Special rounds cannot be explained simply by the increased amount of text to read or information to process as these were equivalent for the two types of trial outcome (Figure 3b ). In all these cases the information demands of the trials being contrasted were therefore matched whilst the decision making processes or observed outcomes varied.
Another potential methodological weakness of the current procedure was the low number of Special rounds used in each participant pair (4 trials). This was done as we were concerned that repeated presentation of Special rounds with altered payoffs would dilute the normative status of the response convention established by players in the preceding rounds. Although it is more common practice to average fMRI data over many more trials in each subject, there is no commonly accepted minimum number of trials per condition for effective fMRI investigations, and some studies have successfully measured the BOLD response to single trials in single subjects (Posse et al. 2001; Michelli, Price, Henson, Friston, 2003) . The minimum number of trials required to measure a given BOLD response depends upon the size of the effect to be measured, together with the number of participants tested and the inherent variability of the measured signal (all of which factor together to determine the statistical power of a given study). As we could not be sure of the expected size of activations under each condition a priori, the low trial numbers meant that a risk for the current study was Type II statistical errors whereby we failed to detect activations which were in fact present in our participants. In the light of this we report activations uncorrected for multiple comparisons (see Lieberman, & Cunningham, 2009 for a justification). Significant multi-voxel clusters of activity were observed in all the main contrasts between trial types and outcomes of interest, suggesting that the study did not suffer from excessive Type II statistical errors. Nevertheless,
given that the rates of deviation did not differ significantly from the 1 st to the 4 th round, we conclude that future fMRI studies may safely increase the number of Special rounds to increase statistical power without compromising the nature of the coordination game.
Finally, it is interesting to directly compare the results of the current fMRI study with those reported for the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game, which is a more commonly used model task for studying adherence and deviation from social cooperative norms (Rilling et al. 2002) . In the PD game, activity in the "antero-lateral striatum" and ventro-medial / Orbitofrontal cortex.was found to be increased during decisions to "Cooperate", presumably reflecting the anticipated social and monetary reward of the outcome. Both the OFC and antero-lateral region were maximally activated by Cooperate-Cooperate trial outcomes in the PD. Interestingly, our results show striatal activity very close to the region described as the antero-lateral striatum in
Rilling et al.'s study (labelled "Head of Caudate" in Tables 1 and 2 below) . Activations were also observed in this region in advance of Player 1 decisions to deviate (i.e. obtain additional monetary reward) as well as during observation of non-coordinating outcomes on Normal rounds. In contrast to the PD game however OFC activation in the present study was located in the lateral rather than medial part of the structure (see discussion of lateral versus OFC activity above).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In common with other studies which have used tasks in which participants decide whether to adhere or deviate from social norms, we find evidence for activity in limbic brain structures which mediate approach and avoidance behaviours during a coordination game. Our analysis suggests that it may be the anticipated negative consequences of deviation that sustain coordination as well as the rewarding aspects of adhering to behavioural convention. The findings also indicate that norm breaches may only elicit an aversive response when they have no rational explanation for the recipient and that the extent of previous periods of coordination on a convention may affect the brain response when participants consider breaking the established "norm" later in the game. We suggest that coordination games of the type used here have considerable potential for future explorations of norm driven behaviour and brain processes in humans. Figure 1 Task design and procedure. a) Payoff matrix for Normal and Special rounds. Player 1's payoffs are shown first. On Normal rounds there is a incentive for both players to find a behavioural convention and continue with that coordinating convention. On Special rounds there is an incentive for Player 1 to deviate from the established convention to gain additional monetary reward. b) Decision and Outcome period screens displayed to participants during the task. During the decision period both players were given information about the payoffs on that trial, with only Player 1 seeing the payoffs for both participants. During the outcome period both players were told what the actual choices and payouts were for both players, along with their total earnings for the game. Figure 3 Activity during decision periods and outcome periods. a) During decision periods on Special rounds, enhanced activity was observed in the anterior insula (ins) and amygdala (amg) prior to coordinate decisions in Player 1 (contrast of Coordinate versus Deviate decisions for Special rounds only). In contrast when Player 1 choose to deviate from the established convention to gain additional monetary reward significant activity was seen in the mid-brain (mb), caudate (cd) and orbitofrontal cortex (ofc) compared to coordinate b) During outcome periods regions showing increased activity for Coordinating versus non-coordinating outcomes on Normal rounds included a cluster in the amygdala. Spontaneous deviations were also sometimes observed on Normal rounds even after a coordination had been established (see behavioural data). Analysis of outcome period activity in participants who observed these non-coordinating outcomes on Normal rounds showed relative increases in the bilateral anterior insula (ins), rostral medial prefrontal cortex (rmPFC), mid-brain and orbitofrontal cortex (ofc) relative to Coordinating outcomes. 
